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Abstract—The Ejectable Data Record (EDR) subsystem was a 
unique development opportunity at NASA with challenges that 
necessitated innovation. EDR employed a “skunkworks” 
development approach in which we designed, built, and 
delivered 47 end items, not including ground support 
equipment. We used as many COTS components as possible, we 
looked for process efficiencies to meet our tight deadlines, and 
the EDR team was involved in the flight operations of the AA-2 
test flight and responsible for the recovery operations of the 
ejected payloads. This paper will discuss the design and 
development of the EDR subsystem, as well as the results of the 
system performance during the AA-2 test flight.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
NASA’s Artemis mission [1] is dedicated to putting the first 
woman and next man on the surface of the Moon by 2024. 
With this mission, NASA will explore more of the Moon’s 
surface than ever before and the lessons learned from this 
mission will enable NASA to push the boundaries of human 
technology farther by going to Mars.  
To enable the Artemis mission, NASA is developing four 
main vehicles. The Space Launch System (SLS) will launch 
humans and cargo into space.  The Orion spacecraft will ferry 
humans from Earth to Lunar orbit. The crew will dock at 
Gateway, positioned between the Earth and the Moon. There 
they will live and work, with frequent expeditions to the 
surface of the Moon with the Human Landing System (HLS). 
The Orion spacecraft [2] is a key piece of this architecture. 
Not only is it the vehicle that will carry the crew into space, 
but it also provides emergency abort capability, supports the 
crew on their journey to the Moon, and provides a safe trip 
back to the surface of the Earth when the crew’s expedition 
is complete.  
One important aspect of this spacecraft is the ability to abort 
during launch ascent in the event that the booster encounters 
a problem. This feature is the Launch Abort System (LAS). 
The LAS is a rocket-powered tower on top of the crew 
module that will quickly, and safely, maneuver the crew 
module away from the booster, in the event of a launch issue.  
As part of the development of the LAS, there were two main 
tests. The first was Pad Abort 1 (PA-1) that successfully 
completed on May 6, 2010. The second was the Ascent Abort 
2 (AA-2) test flight that successfully completed on July 2, 
2019 [3]. This paper will discuss the design and development 
of an ejectable data recorder that collected data from all the 
instrumentation on the crew module used for the AA-2 test 
flight.  
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20200001540 2020-03-28T19:13:58+00:00Z
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2. BACKGROUND  
The Ascent Abort-2 Test flight was the fourth test in the 
Orion flight test program. The purpose of the test was to 
perform an ascent abort with the LAS under flight-like, high 
dynamic pressure conditions. The primary objective of the 
test was to demonstrate that the LAS would effectively 
maneuver the Crew Module (CM) away from the booster and 
jettison from the CM (See Figure 1).   A secondary objective 
of the test was to collect flight test data, which NASA will 
use in the future to certify the Orion vehicle for use on crewed 
missions.  
 
Figure 1: AA-2 Flight Test Profile 
The flight test vehicle for AA-2 consisted of the LAS, the 
CM, the separation ring (SR), and the abort test booster. 
Initially, the CM contained the avionics, power, guidance, 
navigation, and control (GNC), flight software (FSW), 
developmental flight instrumentation (DFI), communications 
antennae, and pyrotechnics to run the flight test. Management 
for the crew module and separation ring (CSR) added the 
ejectable data recorder (EDR) subsystem to the CM due to a 
risk in the communication design about one year after design 
work on the AA-2 crew module had already begun.  
In the original concept of operations, the primary method of 
obtaining the flight data from the instrumentation was to use 
a single string antenna network situated on the LAS. 
However, there would be data dropouts during abort from the 
booster and LAS jettison.  Furthermore, the CSR team 
expected the CM to tumble after LAS-jettison, which would 
lead to further loss of data and the risk that the CSR team 
would not capture the mission critical data. To mitigate this 
risk, the DFI and communications team performed a trade 
study, which resulted in the addition of antennae on the CM, 
an onboard buffer and rebroadcast through the 
communications system after LAS jettison, as well as the 
addition of the EDR subsystem.  By including the EDR 
subsystem, onboard recorders would capture all the test flight 
data during the test and jettison those recorders at the 
conclusion of the test flight, ensuring there would be no gaps 
in the flight data.   
 
3. EDR SUBSYSTEM OVERVIEW 
The EDR subsystem consists of a recorder system and an 
ejection system.  There are two strings of each for 
redundancy, as shown in Figure 2.   
 
Figure 2: EDR Subsystem Block Diagram 
 
Recorder System 
The recorder system consists of a break out box and payloads.  
The breakout box receives and routes power and data to six 
EDR computers located inside the breakout box.  There is one 
separate computer for each payload. The breakout box 
receives all the instrumentation data from the DFI system.  
The EDR computer then writes that DFI data to the memory 
card, which is located in the payload. The EDR computer also 
sends health and status information back to DFI about the 
recorder system.  Furthermore, the breakout box provides a 
pass through for charging the payload batteries prior to 
launch.   
The payloads store the data provided by the breakout box in 
a memory card and contain a beacon for recovery purposes.  
The payload beacon receives GPS coordinates and transmits 
them to a satellite network.  Syntactic foam was also used to 
protect the electronic components within the payload and to 
provide buoyancy.  To aid in the recovery efforts, the 
payloads were painted a neon orange color so that they would 
be visible when floating in the ocean.  Two designs of the 
payloads were used during the test flight: the F-Series and the 
P-Series.  Each dispenser had a mixture of the F-series and P-
Series payloads.  The payloads and breakout box were 
designed and developed in-house using a mixture of custom 
designed and COTS components, with an emphasis on using 
as many COTS components as possible.  The recording 
software was an in-house design as well. 
Ejection System 
The ejection system consists of a safety switch, a sequencer, 
and a dispenser.  The safety switch interrupts power to the 
sequencer to prevent inadvertent firing of a payload.    The 
sequencer generates and routes firing power to a specific 
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location in the dispenser via commands from the flight 
computer.  The dispenser carries and indicates when the 
magazine is present and transfers the information to the 
sequencer. Each magazine houses six cartridges, each 
containing a payload. The dispenser transmits the firing 
signals from the sequencer to the pyro device in each 
cartridge, thus ejecting the payload. The sequencer also 
provides health and status information back to the flight 
computer.  The ejection system is all COTS hardware, with 
significant military heritage, and some in-house 
modification.  The ejection system software is an in-house 
design. 
Interfaces 
The EDR subsystem interfaces with many CSR subsystems 
as shown in Figure 3.  The recorder and ejection systems were 
located on the main power bus of the CM power. Many of the 
EDR subsystem components were housed in the forward bay 
of the CM, whereas the sequencer and safety switch were 
located on an isolated pallet in the CM habitable volume. Due 
to the locations of the EDR hardware, there was significant 
harnessing that spanned from the isolated pallets in the CM 
habitable volume through to the forward bay of the CM. The 
ejection system received commands from the main flight 
computer (CSR Avionics) and provided ejection system 
health and status back to the flight computer. Similarly, the 
recording system received data from the DFI system and 
provided recording health and status back to DFI. Finally, the 
software subsystem supported the development of the custom 
ejection system software and the custom recording system 
software.  
 
Figure 3: EDR Subsystem Context Diagram 
 
Concept of Operations 
The concept of operations for the EDR subsystem (Figure 4) 
is relatively simple. Given that the ejection system and 
recorder system are powered off the main bus of the CM, 
when the vehicle is turned on, both the ejection system and 
the recording system are initiated. The ejection system only 
provides minimal health and status information at this time. 
When the DFI system gets turned on, data begins flowing to 
the EDR recording system and the EDR computers 
immediately begin recording data to the memory cards. From 
this point forward, the recording system continues to record 
until the connection is severed when the payloads are ejected.  
Even though the ejection system is on and providing health 
and status information, it is not able to perform an ejection 
because there are multiple inhibits in place for safety reasons. 
In the software, there are two flags that are enabled after 
certain key events occur in the mission timeline. The first is 
when the abort of the booster occurs and the second is when 
LAS jettison occurs. After these key events, the power 
needed for the pyrotechnics to eject is turned on within the 
CSR power distribution unit. One of our requirements was to 
collect all the data of the mission from launch through 20 
seconds after LAS jettison.  Thus, the software commands the 
first ejection at 20 seconds post-LAS jettison and two 
payloads are ejected at once, one from each dispenser. Ten 
seconds after each ejection, another set of payloads is ejected, 
for six ejections. Using this schema enabled us to collect an 
additional 50 seconds of data beyond the requirement, which 
was highly desired.  
 
Figure 4: Concept of Operations for the data retrieval of 
the EDR subsystem. 
As the payloads are ejected, the beacon is triggered to turn on 
and within five minutes, the beacon transmits GPS 
coordinates. The payloads land in the ocean and float until 
they are recovered.  Once recovered, the payloads are washed 
of the salt water and brought back on land. Post-launch, the 
payloads are fully dried, the beacons are turned off, and the 
data is retrieved from the memory cards.  
Key Requirements 
Six key requirements were assigned to the EDR subsystem to 
successfully recover the data from the AA-2 test flight.   
1. The data recorders shall capture all data in the 
DFI/OFI PCM data stream at a rate of 20 Mbps 
during all mission phases, starting with launch and 
ending with data recorder ejections.   
2. The ejection system shall eject the data recorders on 
command from the CSR flight computer.   
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3. The data recorders shall be positively buoyant in salt 
water.   
4. The data recorders shall provide active location 
signals for 14 hours after test flight to permit a very 
high likelihood of recovery.   
5. The data from the data recorders shall be retrievable 
after ejection and immersion in salt water.   
6. The EDR subsystem shall survive all applicable 
loads identified in the ERD [Environments 
Requirement Document], combined in an event-
consistent manner.   
The first key requirement was important for our system to 
meet because the DFI data rate was 20 Mbps and we did not 
want to miss any data in our recording. This requirement was 
successfully verified during acceptance testing of the 
hardware in our CSR Avionics and Software Testing 
Laboratory Environment (CASTLE).  
In developing this subsystem, we attempted to keep 
everything as simple as possible, but also autonomous. A key 
function to this system was to eject the payloads so that they 
could be recoverable. Thus, the second key requirement was 
important to meet this function in the simplest way possible. 
It was verified via acceptance testing in CASTLE with the 
ejection system, as well as through a full ejection test in 
which we exercised the ejection system with live 
pyrotechnics.  
Given that this test flight occurred over the ocean and that we 
needed to successfully retrieve the payloads, it was 
imperative that the payloads floated. Therefore, the third key 
requirement ensures that the payloads float upright and in 
such a manner that they are visible from a boat when floating 
in the ocean. This requirement was verified for each payload 
as part of its assembly process. Once the payloads were 
assembled, they were inserted into a bucket of salt water to 
verify positive floatation and to be balanced appropriately.  
To be successful, we needed to ensure that we had enough 
opportunity to retrieve the payloads, given many possible 
situations on launch day. If, for example, the test flight 
launched on time, but then a storm arrived before or during 
recovery operations could commence, we wanted to ensure 
that the beacons would continue to operate so that we could 
track the payloads throughout the day and still recover them 
before nightfall. Ensuring that the design could withstand 
beacon transmissions every five minutes, over fourteen 
hours, was the fourth key requirement to encompassing all 
possible scenarios during recovery operations. This 
requirement was verified with multiple long duration beacon 
tests. In the first case, an engineering unit payload was left 
outside with the beacon transmitting GPS coordinates every 
five minutes for a total of 20 hours. After this verification was 
completed, there were design changes associated with the 
switchboard that triggered the beacon to turn on. Thus, 
another verification occurred with qualification units after a 
full ejection test, in which the beacons turned on with the 
ejection and then transmitted GPS coordinates for 14 hours 
after the ejection test was complete.  
Given the concept of operations for the payloads, they must 
survive the vibration and abort during launch, LAS-jettison, 
the ejection after LAS-jettison, the impact of landing in the 
ocean, and the salt water environment for the duration of the 
recovery operation. After all that exposure, we still need to 
ensure that we can retrieve all of the data off the memory card 
without issue. Thus, the fifth key requirement focuses on 
ensuring that the hardware used to store the data and the 
interface by which the data is retrieved does not get damaged 
during the flight and recovery. This requirement was verified 
piecemeal with a live ejection test and a drop test. For the 
ejection test, qualification payloads were ejected using 
engineering unit ejection hardware and then the payloads 
were left in a bucket of salt water for 14 hours. For the drop 
test, qualification payloads were dropped from an altitude of 
5,000 ft into the ocean and recovered via the same means 
planned for launch day.  
The sixth key requirement was a complex one in that 
involved all the environments the subsystem would 
encounter (i.e. vibration, acceleration, shock, and acoustics). 
These environments were quite intense and thus it was 
important to ensure the subsystem could perform its functions 
successfully while simultaneously contending with these 
environments. This requirement was verified via multiple 
stress analyses, vibration tests, acoustic tests, ejection tests, 
and drop tests.  
 
4. BREAKOUT BOX  
The Breakout Box (BOB) has two main functions. The 
primary function is to receive the DFI data and write data at 
20Mbps to six payloads during all required phases of flight. 
The secondary function of the BOB is to serve as a passive 
feedthrough for payload battery charging.   
Breakout Box Design 
The Breakout Box is powered by 28VDC from the CM Power 
Distribution Unit. This 28VDC is delivered to an internal DC 
– DC Converter Power Board that produces eight channels of 
output power. The eight channels of output power are used to 
power the clock splitter, data splitter, and the six Field 
Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)/Raspberry Pi 3 Model B 
pairs. These design details can be seen in the block diagram 
of Figure 5. 
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Figure 5: Block diagram of the Breakout Box and its 
external interfaces. 
In the original design, the BOB only contained the power and 
data splitting, where as the Raspberry Pi was intended to be 
embedded within the payload. However, the Raspberry Pi 
alone was unable to handle the required data throughput of 
20 Mbps. Thus, the FPGA was added to the design to support 
that requirement and stacked with the Raspberry Pi. The 
FPGA/Pi stack was larger than the payload packaging could 
withstand and thus this computing element was then housed 
in the BOB.  
The recording software had the primary objective of ensuring 
that the DFI data was robustly and properly recorded over the 
required phases of flight. A secondary objective was to 
provide a system status, as much as possible, so that a 
decision about the recording status could be made in the 
control room. It was understood that at a certain point the 
payloads would be installed for a final time and that their 
removal would no longer be possible before flight. The data 
on the payloads could only be reviewed after the removal of 
a payload from the system. The control room did have a 
payload USB mount status, which provided indication of 
whether a drive was mounted appropriately. A positive 
indication that a drive was mounted was a significant 
indication that data would successfully be recorded, based on 
all prior testing. Similar to a flight data recorder, the new data 
would need to overwrite the prior data given a finite limit on 
storage capacity. Thus, the entire set of flight data had to be 
capable of being recorded within the allowable data storage 
limit of the payload USB, as well as a methodology for 
determining the beginning and end of the flight data of 
interest.   
The design intent of the Breakout Box was to be cost effective 
and design efficient. In order to achieve this, we focused on 
using COTS items and designs already in use. The cost 
effective computational power of the Raspberry Pi 3 Model 
B made it a great solution for producing the USB protocol 
required for writing data to the payloads. The Clock and Data 
Splitters were based on an existing in-house design.  
Breakout Box Testing 
The BOB production design was primarily validated during 
the engineering unit phase. Therefore, the objective to ensure 
a quality flight build, was to reduce the risk of a failure at the 
integration level by performing intelligent tests intermediate 
to integration. An individual test of the power splitter boards 
was performed on each board. There was also a functionality 
test performed on each FPGA/Pi stack to screen out any 
failures. The result was that at the integration level, each 
BOB performed per its design requirements and no re-work 
was required. The BOBs were then put through thermal and 
vibration acceptance testing, as an integrated system, to 
ensure that there were no latent failures and that they were 
performing in accordance with their intended design. 
Lessons Learned 
The testing at intermediate levels of build resulted in a one 
hundred percent throughput yield on all three flight BOBs at 
the integration level, which was an exciting result given the 
complexity of build. Thus, future projects of this type should 
consider the importance of intermediate testing to mitigate 
assembly risks that could require rework.  
Another lesson learned was to ensure that the software and 
hardware side of the design were in close communication. 
The two aspects go hand in hand and the more collaboration 
that exists, the better the design.  
Finally, having the ability to know what data was recorded, 
the quantity of data, or something similar, without removal of 
the payloads, would have been invaluable. However, adding 
this level of detail to the health and status information 
received would have also increased the complexity.  
 
5. EJECTION SYSTEM 
The data recorders were dispensed from the CM using a 
modified version of a flare/chaff ejection system used on 
combat aircraft, namely the AN/ALE-47 Airborne 
Countermeasures Dispenser System (referenced to as ALE-
47 from here on out).   This system uses a pyrotechnic charge 
to energize the ejection of the flare/chaffs, which were 
deemed suitably close in mass and volume specifications to 
the mass and volume constraints achievable by the EDR 
design.  The ALE-47 flare/chaffs are designed to self-activate 
upon ejection, with no electrical commanding necessary.  
Thus, the off-the-shelf version of the ALE-47 system does 
not include an electrical interface to the flare/chaffs 
themselves. In this system, the ejectable flare/chaffs (along 
with a gas sealing ‘piston’) are loaded into metal cartridges 
and retained by caps that are preloaded and crimped into 
place in a factory operation. Upon field installation, 
electrically actuated squibs (pyrotechnics) are loaded into the 
base of the cartridge and a set of prepared cartridges are 
loaded into the dispensing system such that upon receipt of 
the firing signal, the gas pressure of the squib pushes the 
piston to force the chaff/flare against the crimped cap and out 
of the cartridge. The pyrotechnic firing pulses are provided 
by a remote avionics unit that is an integral part of the ALE-
47 system and receives ejection commands from the vehicle 
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flight control computer. The modular dispensing system can 
accommodate a varying number of different sized cartridges; 
in the case of the AA-2 EDR subsystem, we used the largest 
size cartridge which led to several unused squib channels. 
Modifications to off-the-shelf hardware: 
NASA AA-2 designers modified the ejection system to 
include eight electrical conduction paths to each payload, 
using a pair of phono jack style electrical connectors at the 
aft end of each payload. The unused squib channels provided 
the physical locations for these payload interface paths. One 
payload jack was used for charging the payload’s three-cell 
battery, while the other was used to pass the flight data to the 
memory card storage device.  One noteworthy finding is that 
the memory card storage device’s ability to properly receive 
data was very sensitive to the order in which the four 
conductors (power, ground, signal +, and signal -) were 
configured on the in-line jack.  Only when the signal + and 
signal - lines were separated by the ground conductor was the 
vehicle able to pass its data to the memory card storage device 
within each payload. 
The vibroacoustic loads during the abort sequence of the AA-
2 flight also necessitated modification to the ALE-47 system 
from its off-the-shelf design.  The system was not rated for 
the high vibration environment of the abort regime, and 
required a mounting interface that included vibration 
isolators (Figure 6).  Typically, the dispenser for an ALE-47 
system includes only a structural interface near the muzzle of 
the dispenser, but in its use for AA-2 an additional set of 
structural fasteners engaged the breech end of the dispenser. 
This provided a non-cantilevered structural path to the 
isolation brackets, whose collective centroid was designed to 
be close to the center of gravity of the isolated mass in order 
to avoid cross-coupling of the vibration motion axes.  Even 
though the AA-2 abort vibroacoustic environment was an 
order of magnitude more intense than the rating of the off-
the-shelf ejection system, the provisions stated above allowed 
the modified system to pass qualification vibration testing to 
abort levels. 
 
Figure 6: Dispenser isolator additions to accommodate 
the AA-2 vibroacoustic loads. 
 
Selection trade-offs: 
Although early development options for the EDR ejection 
system considered pneumatic and mechanical ejection 
systems, the modified ALE-47 was selected due to its 
heritage and availability.  There were significant benefits, 
from a cost and schedule perspective, of using a system that 
required only partial modification, rather than a full in-house 
development. However, whenever using a COTS system, 
there will be some disadvantages in that the existing design 
may not conform to NASA best practices and will have to be 
accepted as-is.  One example we encountered is that the ALE-
47 system is designed such that the electrical return path for 
the pyrotechnic firing pulse is electrically bonded to the 
vehicle chassis, which is in violation of NASA protocol.  This 
led to significant resources being used to satisfy that the 
system was still acceptable despite the violation. 
Testing: 
The EDR subsystem employed a strategy of development 
through iterative and incremental risk reduction testing to 
meet compressed schedule and tight budget constraints. The 
testing started with initial feasibility assessments and grew 
more integrated and complex with each iteration (Figure 7). 
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Figure 7: Ejection System Testing Flow. 
  
In accordance with this strategy, ejection system testing 
commenced at the earliest stages of the project to demonstrate 
suitability of the ALE-47 system. To accomplish this test 
efficiently and cost effectively, we used an existing test unit 
at a vendor facility to eject inert mass and volume 
representatives of an EDR payload. With this testing, we 
needed to ensure that the ejection force was sufficient to 
overcome the crimp on the cartridge that held the payload 
inside, as well as propel the payload with enough velocity so 
that it would clear the CM upon ejection. We optically 
measured the ejection velocity and showed that the payloads 
would cleanly separate from the CM. We also used a force 
gauge measurement to show that the crimp of the cartridge 
exceeded what was necessary to hold the payload inside the 
cartridge so it would not prematurely eject during the 
acceleration and vibration environments of launch. 
Conducting this early testing validated using the existing 
ALE-47 COTS system, even though the environments at this 
stage were not fully defined. The payload separation 
interfaces at ejection are between the payload, the cartridge, 
and the dispenser. To demonstrate the feasibility of the EDR 
payload data and power connector separation concept 
required non-active development payloads and modified 
cartridges, along with the vendor’s existing test unit. 
Performing these early feasibility demonstrations, focusing 
on the ejection system capabilities, allowed us to retire major 
design risks as early as possible. 
Given that the ALE-47 system is a military COTS system, we 
were unable to perform significant stress analysis of the 
hardware. Furthermore, the vibro-acoustic environments of 
the AA-2 mission were substantially greater than the rated 
capabilities of the standard ALE-47 system. Therefore, 
vibration testing of the combined payload and dispenser 
system was also initiated early in the development process. 
Initial testing demonstrated that the dispenser and associated 
ALE-47 avionics components could survive the anticipated 
environment. This testing also showed that the crimped 
cartridges could retain the EDR payloads against the high 
vibration levels. Note that we learned in an early vibration 
test that properly preloaded cartridge crimping was critical to 
payload retention. In that early test, a set of development 
payloads, loaded in cartridges, did self-eject during vibration 
testing due to improper crimping. 
Next, testing focused on demonstration of data transmission 
integrity through the interfaces between the dispenser and the 
payload. Initial functional testing appeared to proceed 
successfully. However, when testing the recording capability 
during exposure to the vibration environment, we found 
issues with data integrity. The issue with data integrity was a 
twofold problem. The first issue was that the software tools 
we developed for evaluating data integrity had flaws. Once 
those defects were corrected, we then found that the phono 
plug data interface was corrupting the data. Troubleshooting 
of this issue, via dedicated transmission testing with the 
integrated system, revealed impedance issues with the 
proximity of the high frequency data signal paths in the 
phono connector, which inhibited the transmission of a clear 
signal. This issue was resolved by changing the pin order on 
the phono plug to physically separate the data signal paths. 
With confidence established in the core functionality of the 
ejection system, we then performed vibration of the 
integrated ejection system with live pyrotechnic squibs to 
verify the squibs could also withstand the environment 
without firing during vibration and still eject appropriately 
after the exposure. This test culminated in live ejections of 
payloads. High-speed video evaluation of the ejection 
performance confirmed that the system performance 
remained adequate when used with the fully realized payload 
design. 
Finally, a complete EDR ejection system was integrated into 
the AA-2 CASTLE test rig in order to demonstrate 
functionality of the ejection commanding and data recording 
interfaces with the flight vehicle systems. To verify the 
ejection system performance without having to perform live 
ejections, we developed a low-cost squib test set for end-to-
end assessment of simulated ejection signals. This test set 
was constructed from used ejection system components, 
consumer grade lab instrumentation systems, and a laptop 
computer with a simple custom script capable of detailed 
signal evaluation of the squib firing pulses.  
Findings and Lessons Learned: 
The status of the ejectable data recorder subsystem as a 
latecomer to the mission architecture and as a backup 
subsystem allowed the design team to approach their 
objectives in an unconventional manner.  Engineering design 
and development proceeded in the absence of a complete set 
of requirements, and in retrospect this resulted in design 
closure more rapidly than the typical approach of settling on 
final requirements first before initiating development.  
Because design is inherently an iterative process, in many 
cases it is advantageous to begin early with an incomplete set 
of requirements, relying only on engineering judgment to 
accommodate any requirement deficiencies.  This allows 
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more time to see where the critical margins are and which 
parameters of the design are the most sensitive.  These 
findings in turn inform the requirements of the system and 
result in faster convergence on a final solution.  
 
6. PAYLOAD 
The EDR payloads (Figure 8) are data recording devices and 
beacons that are connected to the DFI system through the 
breakout box and contained inside the ALE-47 dispenser 
during launch. The payloads have three main functions: store 
data from the flight test, survive the environmental conditions 
of the flight test, and transmit their coordinates for recovery. 
There were twelve payloads used for flight, consisting of two 
different flight designs: the F-series and P-series. 
 
Figure 8: Payload block diagram (left) and flight 
payload image (right). 
 
Payload Design 
The EDR payload mass and volume were designed as drop-
in substitutes for the typical decoy chaff/flares of the ALE-47 
system. In order to survive the AA-2 flight environments, the 
ejection, and water impacts, as well as remaining afloat after 
impact, the payload structure was composed of a plastic shell 
completely filled with a syntactic foam composed of marine 
grade epoxy and glass micro balloons. The foam mix was 
designed to ensure buoyancy of the complete unit with 
sufficient stability necessary to achieve adequate antennae 
pointing. The fully potted nature of the foam ensured the 
survivability of the payload electronics. The plastic shell and 
support structure was designed for low-cost fabrication using 
additive manufacturing techniques. 
To enable quick and cost-effective development and 
assembly, the payloads incorporated multiple COTS items 
that were integrated and encased in syntactic foam.  The 
internal COTS components included a USB memory card, an 
Iridium modem, a GPS antenna, an Iridium antenna, and a 
hobby Lithium Polymer battery. Internal harnessing and the 
switchboard that turned on the beacon were designed and 
fabricated in-house or contracted out.  While the primary 
COTS components were uniform throughout all twelve 
payloads, there were fundamental differences in the 
electronic switchboards that would switch the system from a 
‘stand-by’ state into a transmission state.  
The system used two separate phono plug receptacles: one 
was tied to the battery for charging and battery monitoring, 
and the other was tied to the memory card for data storage. 
The switchboard was connected to the battery. While the 
payload was inside the dispenser and the phono plugs were 
connected, the beacon system stayed in a non-transmitting, 
standby state. This kept the battery from directly powering 
the modem until the payload was ejected. 
The F-Series payloads were the culmination of multiple 
iterative designs developed over the course of the project. 
The switching mechanism was a novel design that used 
friction contacts between metal clips externally mounted to 
the payload and the metal cartridge case in which the payload 
was housed, as well as internally tied to the switching circuit. 
As the payloads were ejected from the cartridge, the contact 
was opened and would trigger a state change in the board to 
initiate antenna transmission. Once the beacon was switched 
on, it was latched in that state and would have to be reset via 
a special process to unlatch it and turn off the beacon. This 
latching feature was due to the concern of an open short 
occurring with the exposed phono receptacle contacts after 
the payloads splashed down in the ocean.  
The P-Series payloads were a backup design to meet 
technical and schedule objectives of the EDR subsystem, 
given technical difficulties encountered with the F-Series 
development that required continued modifications. Given 
schedule constraints, the P-Series switchboard was proposed 
as a parallel design that removed the latching capability and 
significantly reduced design complexity, with the aim to 
supplement the primary F-Series in case of continued 
performance shortcoming. The P-Series payloads operated 
using a photo-resistor to control the state of the payload 
between the deployed (transmitting) and stored (charging) 
states. The photo-resistor had a low impedance when the 
photo-resistor was exposed to light (i.e. sunlight encountered 
once the payload was ejected), and a high impedance when 
the photo-resistor was absent of light (i.e. the payload was 
encased in the cartridge and in the dispenser). The sensitivity 
of the photo-resistor circuit was tuned such that beacon would 
be sensitive enough to stay in the “on” state while the photo-
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resistor was occluded by the water, but not so sensitive that it 
would remain in the “on” state while in its cartridge.  Given 
that the P-Series was a backup payload design, and was 
introduced later in the development process, the development 
of the P-Series payloads was highly expedited in order to 
meet the install date of the EDR system. 
Payload Testing 
Early development testing of the EDR payload concept 
focused on demonstrating feasibility of the fully potted 
syntactic foam concept. The primary risk of mechanical 
survivability against water impact loads was answered by 
dropping and recovering simulated payload shapes of 
representative foam construction, without any electronics, 
from sufficient altitude to ensure impact at greater than 
estimated terminal velocity. In subsequent testing, fully 
capable engineering unit payloads were dropped off-shore in 
the Gulf of Mexico using a NASA aircraft asset and 
recovered with a chartered off-shore vessel.  
To ensure reliability of the flight payloads, the individual 
piece parts and assembled payloads underwent an exhaustive 
test program through all expected flight test environments.  
Prior to assembly, the USB memory card underwent an 11 
hour burn in test, the beacon underwent a functional burn in 
test, and the battery underwent three rounds of charge and 
discharge cycles. The switchboard underwent several rounds 
of functional testing, as well as thermal cycling to find any 
defects in the boards. Once assembled, the payloads were 
subjected to multiple rounds of environmental testing to 
ensure that they would be able to survive the relatively short 
duration mission. To validate that the payloads maintained 
active data retention during the vibration profiles, the 
payloads were integrated with the dispenser and mounted to 
a vibration table. A data generator was used to mimic the DFI 
data stream to the breakout box, which was then connected to 
the payloads via the dispenser interface. By initiating data 
recording prior to vibration exposure, the team could use test 
time stamps to discern where, if any, dropouts in data 
retention were occurring and on which channel. This helped 
lead to a robust design that ultimately was successfully tested 
to levels higher than seen on the actual flight test. 
Another component of the qualification testing was to 
validate that the payload was not damaged during the ejection 
process, where a pyrotechnic squib was used to eject the 
payload from its retention cartridge. There were two live 
ejection tests performed. In the first one, live data was 
recorded during vibration and then the payloads were ejected 
after the vibration was complete. In the second ejection test, 
live data was recorded during the ejection to verify there was 
no corruption to the data because of the severed interface 
during ejection. In both cases, after ejection, the team 
recovered the payloads and oriented them with the antennas 
facing towards the sky, so they could make satellite 
connections. Once we verified that the payloads were 
transmitting their location, we left the payloads transmitting 
for 14 hours to verify the full beacon functionality.  
Lessons Learned 
Through rigorous environmental, qualification and functional 
testing, multiple lessons learned were gathered for future 
developments. The most overarching lesson was seemingly 
the most straight forward: Keep the design as simple as 
possible to meet requirements. One example, in retrospect, 
was the latching ability of the switchboard. While there was 
no specific requirement to add latching, there was an early 
assumption that without latching, the payload could short in 
the water. This decision was made early-on and without any 
developmental testing. The F-Series was designed to latch, 
which greatly increased the complexity and inherent failure 
modes possible with that payload build. In contrast, the P-
Series did not have that latching mechanism and the overall 
complexity of the total system was greatly reduced.  
Another lesson learned that stems from the notion of keeping 
the design simple is to protect the key functions of the design. 
Originally, the payload switchboard operated by detecting the 
presence of a USB connection when in the dispenser. 
Unfortunately, this design decision led to multiple 
unexplained failures of the USB memory card, which, if 
implemented in the final design, would have resulted in 
failure of the payload’s main function to record the data. 
After discovering this failure mode and understanding the 
root cause, we decided to divorce the USB and switchboard 
in order to protect the main function of recording the data. 
This was implemented on both F- and P-Series payloads and 
ensured virtually no errors in recorded data during final 
testing and day of launch. 
 
7. RECOVERY OPERATIONS 
The recovery operations were designed to ensure successful 
collection of all the payloads post-launch. The nominal 
operations assumed most of the beacons would function as 
intended, but contingency operations were also developed in 
the event that there were a number of non-operational 
beacons.  
Recovery Strategy 
The planned strategy used two boats for nominal recovery 
operations and a third boat for off-nominal situations during 
the recovery:  
• If boat 1 or 2 had a problem, boat 3 would continue 
operation 
• If there was a personnel health issue on one of the 
boats, boat 3 would continue operation while the 
person was taken to shore 
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• If position coordinates were not received by any of 
the payloads, boat 3 could support contingency 
operations  
To ensure adequate data collection on ocean drift patterns for 
the contingency operations and to ensure all the boat assets 
were staged sufficiently outside of the keep out zones, 
recovery operations were planned to begin two hours prior to 
launch.  Enroute to the staging location, one of the boats was 
to deploy two spare payloads near the projected splashdown 
location in order to collect ocean current heading and speed, 
which enabled recovery planning in the event that none of the 
flight payloads transmitted their location after jettison.  
Figure 9 below shows the keep out locations, boat staging 
areas, and the spare payload deploy point.  
 
Figure 9: Pre-Launch Payload Drop Zone 
The nominal payload recovery plan was to focus on retrieving 
payloads where location information was received. If we 
regularly received GPS coordinates on console from a 
specific payload (within 20 minutes), the beacon was 
considered a healthy beacon and high priority for retrieval. 
After those payloads with healthy beacons were recovered 
and the likelihood another beacon ping might not arrive, then 
the contingency procedures were enacted. These procedures 
consisted of the three boats performing a grid search pattern, 
led by the prime boat, and informing the console operators 
when payloads were recovered. 
Suspension of recovery operations would have occurred due 
to bad weather (lightning, sea state), darkness (sunset), or the 
remaining payloads were not transmitting position 
coordinates and the grid search was not successful. 
Console Operation and Beacon Tracking Software 
The nominal recovery operations were directed from the 
mission control center through EDR console positions.  One 
position was the primary recovery position and 
communicated with the boats, the test director, and weather.  
The other two console positions were dedicated to flight 
operations during the launch. The two flight console 
positions were reconfigured to support recovery operations 
after splashdown.  The console operators each had a copy of 
the beacon tracking software so that they could independently 
track the payload and boat locations. 
The beacons of each payload contained a GPS-Iridium 
modem that automatically collected geolocation 
(latitude/longitude), timestamp (date & time), health status 
information (supply voltage) and payload identification 
information with a frequency of approximately five minutes. 
The actual data acquisition frequency, however, was 
dependent on GPS satellite availability and Iridium satellite 
network visibility within the payload’s antenna horizon. 
Once a GPS lock was attained and the corresponding 
ancillary data was captured, the information was transmitted 
via the Iridium Short Burst Data (SBD) data package protocol 
through the Iridium satellite network, which immediately 
resulted in a system-generated email message. This email 
message was sent to the EDR console operators, and 
contained the aforementioned SBD data. 
In order to establish and monitor the current locations of the 
EDR payloads in real-time, customized Python and Linux 
code was developed to autonomously parse the individual 
SBD data packets. The code was designed specifically to 
leverage off currently available open-source software tools, 
and therefore allowed for the direct interfacing with the 
Google Earth (GE) geospatial visualization software. Upon 
the arrival of an Iridium email message containing an SBD 
message, the software tools automatically extracted and 
parsed the geolocation, timestamp, system health and 
payload identification information in order to generate 
individualized xml KML files for use in GE. This approach 
allowed for automatically and simultaneously tracking and 
visualizing multiple EDR payloads in GE as a result of the 
updated KML data generated from the incoming Iridium 
messages. The resulting availability of real-time positional 
data that showed the locations, tracklines and status of all 
active payloads in GE was then used for directing and 
coordinating the boat recovery efforts for retrieving the EDRs 
(Figure 10). Additionally, all incoming SBD data was 
summarized and displayed in a customized color-coded 
tabular Python display that served as a “quick look” tool for 
determining overall payload performance and individual 
elapsed time of the last known location. 
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Figure 10: Payload locations, drift tracks, and predicted 
locations. 
In addition to simultaneously displaying the current locations 
for all the payloads, the software was designed to 
autonomously generate predictions on where the payloads 
could be located at 5-minutes and 10-minutes in the future. 
These predictions were generated using the last two known 
payload locations and corresponding timestamps, since this 
information allowed for deriving dispersal velocities based 
on the elapsed time between each reported location and the 
distance between the reported locations, as well as the 
dispersal trajectories (i.e.: heading). When combined with an 
Earth sphere model, this information allowed for calculating 
the predicted latitude and longitude locations for each 
payload at any given point in time. Data collected before and 
after the AA-2 launch demonstrated high accuracy of the 
derived real-time prediction locations (approx. 38 meters). 
 
8. SUBSYSTEM FLIGHT PERFORMANCE 
Recording System Performance 
The final installation of the payloads into the CM was on 
March 15, 2019. From that installation date through the flight 
test, the system recorded over 2800 minutes of data (> 430 
GB) onto each payload drive. Per the design of the recording 
software, once the drive space was full, the data would wrap 
and overwrite old data.  The only data of interest was the data 
associated with the flight test.  
On the day of launch, all the payload drives mounted as 
intended and there were no anomalies noted on console. After 
recovery of the payloads, the EDR team retrieved the data 
from the payloads without any issues. We analyzed the data 
and found virtually identical recordings for the period from 
launch through LAS jettison.  After LAS jettison, the ejection 
system ejected a pair of payloads every ten seconds, and thus 
the pair of payloads that ejected last had the most data on 
them. Of the twelve payloads, only one payload had a 
discrepancy with two minutes fewer data than its ejected pair. 
This payload connected to a channel in the breakout box with 
a known recording issue at the time of launch.  So, this 
outcome in the data was expected.  
With the data from the sixth ejections, we retrieved a 
complete set of continuous data from prior to launch through 
80 seconds post-LAS jettison. We were only required to 
retrieve data through 20 seconds post-LAS jettison, but were 
able to fulfill a desirement of the aerosciences community to 
gather an additional 50 seconds of data. If the project had not 
added the EDR subsystem, there would have been data loss 
during abort and LAS jettison, as well as a few small drops 
throughout the flight. Due to the quality of data recovered 
from the payloads, the EDR data became the primary source 
of data for the AA-2 test flight.  
Ejection System Performance 
On console, leading up to launch, there were no anomalies 
encountered. The ejection system ejected the payloads as 
expected and per the nominal sequence. However, in review 
of the data post-launch, we discovered an anomaly in the 
payload inventory information provided as part of the health 
and status data received from the ejection system. In the 
ejection software, there is a parameter called the software 
expected inventory, which starts at a value of six and then 
decrements by one each time the software commands the 
system to eject. In the sequencer health and status 
information, there is a parameter called sequencer inventory, 
which is health and status information provided to the 
computer by the ejection system. The sequencer inventory is 
the number of payloads the ejection system thinks it currently 
has in the dispenser. The anomaly occurred around the time 
of abort and when the booster was jettisoned. At this time, the 
sequencer inventory drops out and flickers between zero and 
six, which does not align with the software expected 
inventory. Fortunately, the ejection system software was 
written to use the software expected inventory and not the 
sequencer inventory.  Thus, the ejection system properly 
ejected payloads at the appropriate time.  
Recovery Operations Performance 
Prior to launch, the EDR recovery team deployed two drift 
payloads in the drop zone so that we could gather information 
on the drift speed and direction in preparation for contingency 
operations in case the beacons did not operate as intended. 
The drift payloads were moving at 0.5 knot and a bearing of 
65-75°.  
After the payloads ejected, on average, we received 
information from the payload beacon within 9 minutes. 
However, since approximately four months had elapsed since 
the last time the beacons were powered on and connected to 
the GPS and Iridium constellations, we did not receive 
accurate GPS coordinates until approximately 40 mins after 
ejection, on average. That being said, we placed the recovery 
crew near the drop zone during the launch to enable efficient 
recovery of the payloads once the crew was cleared to enter 
the drop zone. In general, we recovered a payload every 4 
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minutes and recovered all twelve payloads within 52 minutes 
(Figure 11).  
 
Figure 11: Successful recovery. 
The ability to recover all the payloads was partly due to how 
closely packed the payloads were after ejection. Given the 
winds and launch parameters, the events of the launch 
occurred within a short area off the coast of Cape Canaveral 
with very little dispersion, as shown in Figure 12.  
 
Figure 12: Locations of where the EDR team recovered 
each payload and the ejection path of the payloads. 
Finally, with our drift payload speed and heading 
information, along with the LAS jettison location, we pre-
planned a grid search area as part of our contingency 
operation. If we had need of the contingency operation, we 
would have most likely found all the payloads since their 
recovery locations fell within our pre-planned grid search 
area (Figure 13).  
 
Figure 13: Pre-planned contingency grid search area 
shown by the red box.  The pushpin icons show the 
payload recovery locations. 
 
 9. SUMMARY  
In summary, the EDR subsystem hardware, software, and 
operations development was a tremendous amount of work in 
a short amount of time. Many lessons learned were gained 
throughout the course of the project, but a couple of 
overarching themes exist.  
First, keep the design as simple as possible to meet the 
requirements. In our case, we inadvertently added in 
complexity due to a risk that we assumed would be an issue, 
rather than first testing to verify whether it actually was an 
issue.  Along with that is the notion of protecting the key 
functions of the design and making those as simple as 
possible to meet the requirements.  
Second, we focused on testing early on to trade and down 
select designs, as well as mitigate risks. In many cases, we 
performed risk-reduction testing without fully formed 
requirements or fully known environments. This enabled us 
to converge rapidly on a design in which we had confidence 
of success. Furthermore, we performed intermediate testing 
throughout the build to ensure no issues during assembly and 
reducing or eliminating the need for rework later on.  
The unconventional processes we used and the ability to 
incorporate lessons learned quickly enabled us to develop a 
system that was fully successful on day of launch.  
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